United States/Common Market Agricultural Trade and the GATT Framework by Dodds, Simon




United States/Common Market Agricultural Trade
and the GATT Framework
Simon Dodds
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the Agriculture Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation




Agricultural Trade and the GATT
Framework
I. INTRODUCTION
The Western World is suffering from its worst recession since the
depression of the 1930s.' While many nations have been successful in
reducing inflation, the level of unemployment continues to rise appreci-
ably.2 Western governments have shielded domestic industries from
foreign competition in an effort to preserve jobs.3 Political pressures
have prompted those governments to fix the blame for their countries'
economic ills on foreign culprits.4 They have turned away from inter-
national free trade and sought political salvation in protectionist poli-
cies.5 The international economic system has undergone severe strain.6
This Comment focuses on the response of one element of that in-
ternational economic system to recession--the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 7 In particular, it analyzes the GATT ap-
1 The newspaper literature on the recession is voluminous. For a general summary, emphas-
ing the rising debt burden of many Third World states, see Longworth, Is The Whole World Going
Broke?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 10, 1982, § 2, at 1, col. 2; for the plight of the American agricul-
ture industry, see N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1982, at 41, col. 4 (national ed.).
2 See generally Longworth, supra note 1.
3 See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1982, at 19, col. 3 (national ed.) (discussing American protec-
tion of its steel industry); N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1983, at 25, col. 4 (national ed.) (discussing French
restrictions on the import of Japanese video recorders); WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1983, at 1, col. 6




7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. Complete text in force as of Mar. 1, 1969, is reprinted in 4 GENERAL
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proach to agricultural export subsidies, emphasizing the reform of agri-
cultural trading policies undertaken during the Tokyo Round of
negotiations.' In an effort to evaluate the results of that reform, this
Comment will discuss the Tokyo Round's impact on agricultural trad-
ing relations between the United States and the European Economic
Community (EEC).9 It will also refer to developments that occurred
during GATT's ministerial meeting in November 1982.10
While the GATT's future remains bleak, the prospects for a reso-
lution of the United States/EEC dispute are bright. GATT's faith in
free trade has proved unrealistic for two reasons. First, the recession
has rendered the ideal politically unattractive, prompting states to
evade GATT regulations." Second, even if the international environ-
ment was amenable to free trade, GATT has proved unable to define
precisely the export subsidies it wishes to curtail.' 2 Instead of provid-
ing clarity, the Tokyo Round has obscured issues and contributed to a
souring of relations between the United States and the EEC.'3 The
Geneva conference has not improved those relations, which now lie at
their lowest ebb in recent history. 14
The prospects for a resolution of the United States/EEC dispute
appear promising despite GATT's failings. Neither side can benefit
from a trade war and that realization has persuaded both to agree to
bilateral negotiations. 5 Those negotiations are likely to produce a
compromise settlement that will include semi-protectionist provisions.
GATT can either turn its back on the negotiations or seek to aid the
parties in their deliberations. While hoping that GATT follows the
second approach, it appears that GATT will continue to preach the
gospel of free trade and that the United States and the EEC will simply
ignore it.'
6
AGREEMENT OF TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1-76
(1980).
8 See infra notes 18-79 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 82-168 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 169-177 and accompanying text.
I1 See infra notes 178-194 and accompanying text.
12 Id
13 Id
14 The agricultural trading dispute is just one of several bones of contention that have bedev-
iled United States/EEC trading relations. Similar issues are at stake in a long-running quarrel
over EEC steel exports to the United States. Policy differences are most strikingly evident over the
issues of sanctions against Poland and defense expenditures.
15 See infra notes 178-194 and accompanying text.
16 Id
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II. AGRICULTURAL EXPORT SUBSIDIES
A. The Inclusion of Agriculture in the GATT Framework
The international trading system that emerged after World War II
rested on the precept of free trade. 7 Advanced western industrial states
institutionalized that ideal in GATT. When initially adopted, GATT
worked to. erase tariff barriers to trade and to foster a liberalization of
international trading relations.' 8 GATT focused on the industrial and
manufacturing sectors of the world economy, leaving agriculture heav-
ily protected and less prone to the pressures of the marketplace.' 9
During the Dillon Round of GATT negotiations,20 the United
States sought to incorporate agricultural issues into the GATT frame-
work. The newly created EEC sought and obtained a delay on the
grounds that it was in the process of formulating a joint policy on agri-
culture.2' The Common Market continued to resist United States ef-
forts to discuss international trade in agriculture during the Kennedy
Round of negotiations.22 At that time, the common agricultural policy
was the Common Market's only joint program, and the Europeans
proved reluctant to enter into a dialogue that might lead to interna-
tional criticism of that policy.
23
American persistence finally paid off during the Tokyo Round of
negotiations.2 4 The Tokyo Round dealt not only with agriculture, but
also considered the broad range of non-tariff trade barriers, such as the
use of export subsidies and dumping.25 Those barriers had supplanted
traditional tariffs as the most significant impediments to international
free trade.26 The longstanding United States/EEC quarrel over the in-
clusion of agriculture reappeared and procedural wranglings over that
issue slowed the progress of the negotiations.27 Nevertheless, the
GATT agreements produced by the Tokyo Round contained a variety
17 See generally MAYNE, THE RECOVERY OF EUROPE (1970); POSTAN, AN ECONOMIC His-
TORY OF WESTERN EUROPE (1967).
18 See REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF GATT: THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILAT-
ERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 18 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL
OF GATT].
19 Id
20 Id The Dillon Round of negotiations took place between 1959 and 1962.
21 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1979).
22 Id The Kennedy Round of negotiations took place between 1963 and 1967.
23 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 206 (1979).
24 Id The Tokyo Round of negotiations took place between 1963 and 1967. See REPORT BY
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of new provisions, including those for agriculture and a revamped sub-
sidies code.2"
The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI,
XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(Agreement),2 9 represented a major achievement of the Tokyo Round
negotiations. The Agreement attempted to regulate the use of subsidies
in agriculture, industry, and manufacturing, and to ensure that their
operation did not impede international trade.3" The core of the Agree-
ment lay in two distinctions. GATT distinguished between impermissi-
ble export subsidies and permissible domestic subsidies.31 It also
treated agriculture differently from industry and manufacturing.32 Al-
though both distinctions contained considerable superficial appeal,
their practical implementation has been unsatisfactory.33
B. The Distinction Between Domestic and Export Subsidies
The reasoning behind GATT's domestic subsidy/export subsidy
distinction stemmed from a recognition that states used "subsidies
other than export subsidies" as important instruments for the promo-
tion of domestic social and economic policy objectives.34 Those policy
goals involved efforts to develop backward regions, sustain employ-
ment, and encourage research and development. 35 While GATT ap-
plauded those goals, it also noted that domestic subsidies were likely to
cause injury to the industries of other states.36 Rather than prohibiting
domestic subsidies entirely, GATT urged member states to "seek to
avoid causing" such injuries.3 7 In particular GATT requested that
states evaluate the aims of the policy and its likely impact on other
states when formulating their policies.
38
28 Id
29 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [hereinafter cited as Agreement on Articles VI, XVI, and
XXIII], Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, - U.N.T.S. - (entered into force for
U.S. July 26, 1979), reprinted in GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 56
(26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as GATT, B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.)].
30 Agreement on Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII, supra note 29, preamble, reprinted in GATT,
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 56.
31 See infra notes 50-79 and accompanying text.
32 Id
33 See infra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
34 Agreement on Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII, supra note 29, art. 11(1), reprinted in GATT,
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 69.
35 Id
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The practical efficacy of the distinction depended on the ease with
which member states could determine whether a particular policy rep-
resented a domestic or export subsidy. GATT made no effort to define
precisely the twin categories and instead provided an illustrative list of
domestic and export subsidies, in the hope that such guidance would
present governments and businessmen with the clarity they required.39
GATT outlined its category of permissible domestic subsidies in Arti-
cle 11(3) of the Agreement.4" In so doing, GATT specifically endorsed
five areas of government operations, permitting: (i) "government
financing of commercial enterprises, including grants, loans or guaran-
tees; (ii) government provision or government-financed provision of
utility supply distribution and other operational or support services or
facilities; (iii) government financing of research and development
programmes; (iv) fiscal incentives; and (v) government subscription to,
or provision of, equity capital."4
GATT's catalog of proscribed export subsidies was both broader
and longer.42 While GATT provided no formal definition of export
39 GATT hoped that the illustrative lists would provide a standard against which state prac-
tices could be judged. In fact, the standard has proved imprecise and riddled with inconsistencies.
See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
40 Agreement on Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII, supra note 29, art. I 1(3), reprinted in GATT,
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 70.
41 d
42 The full text (footnotes omitted) of the illustrative list of export subsidies, reads:
(a) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry contingent
upon export performance.
(b) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which involve a bonus on exports.
(c) Internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated by
governments, on terms more favorable than for domestic shipments.
(d) The delivery by governments or their agencies of imported or domestic products or serv-
ices for use in the production of exported goods, on terms or conditions more favourable
than for delivery of like or directly competitive products or services for ue in the produc-
tion of goods for domestic consumption, if(in the case of products) such terms or condi-
tions are more favourable than those commercially available on world markets to their
exporters.
(e) The full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of
direct taxes or social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial
enterprises.
(f) The allowance of special deductions directly related to exports or export performance,
over and above those granted in respect of production for domestic consumption, in the
calculation of the base on which direct taxes are charged.
(g) The exemption or remission in respect of the production and distribution of exported
products, of indirect taxes in excess of those levied in respect of the production and
distribution of like products when sold for domestic consumption.
(h) The exemption, remission or deferral of prior stage cumulative indirect taxes on goods
or services used in the production of exported products in excess of the exemption, re-
mission or deferral of like prior stage cumulative indirect taxes on goods or services used
in the production of like products when sold for domestic consumption; provided, how-
ever, that [those] ... taxes may be exempted, remitted or deferred on exported products
even when not exempted, remitted or deferred on like products when sold for domestic
consumption, if the. . . taxes are levied on goods that are physically incorporated.
in the exported product.
U.S./Common Market Agricultural Trade
5:326(1983)
subsidy, the illustrative list seemed to indicate that an export subsidy
was any govemment aid that favored goods destined for export over
those produced for internal consumption.43 Thus, while Article 11(3)(i)
permitted government financing of commercial enterprises, "the provi-
sion by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry contin-
gent upon export performance," was deemed illegal.44 Similarly, the
Agreement condemned special tax treatment for exported products and
rejected export credit guarantee programs.45 Item (1) redundantly in-
cluded "any other charge on the public account constituting an export
subsidy in the sense of Article XVI of the General Agreement.
46
The domestic export subsidy distinction appeared to represent a
sensible compromise between the competing interests of state sover-
eignty and international free trade. It recognized the demand on gov-
ernments to combat domestic ailments and avoided regulating
government redevelopment programs that offered no special aid to ex-
ports. At the same time, it vigorously opposed government efforts to
boost exports directly through export subsidies.
The distinction, however, is illusory. GATT permits governments
to finance regional development programs so long as they do not dis-
criminate in favor of export production.47 In effect, GATT proscribes
direct export subsidies, while embracing indirect export subsidies that
masquerade as domestic subsidies. A government grant to a corpora-
tion contingent on its export performance represents a direct export
subsidy, because the grant encourages the corporation to expand ag-
(i) The remission or drawback of import charges in excess of those levied on imported
goods that are physically incorporated. . . in the exported product; provided, however,
that in particular cases a firm may use a quantity of home market goods equal to, and
having the same quality and characteristics as, the imported goods as a substitute for
them in order to benefit from this provision if the import and the corresponding export
operations both occur within a reasonable time period, normally not to exceed two years.
(j) The provision by governments... of export credit guarantee or insurance programmes,
of insurance or guarantee programmes against increases in the costs of exported products
or of exchange risk programmes, at premium rates, which are manifestly inadequate to
cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes.
(k) The grant by governments.., of export credits at rates below those which they actually
have to pay for the funds so employed. . . or the payment by them of all or part of the
costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits, in so far as they
are used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms ....
(1) Any other charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy in the sense of
Article XVI of the General Agreement.
Id annex (a), reprinted in GATT, B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 80.
43 GATT itself does not provide a definition of export subsidy. The definition used here is this
author's distillation extracted from the illustrative list.
44 Agreement on Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII, supra note 29, annex (a), reprinted in GATT,
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 80.
45 Id annex () & (J), at 81.
46 Id annex (1), at 82.
47 See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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gressively overseas. A government grant without that contingency may
not constitute the same type of direct export subsidy, yet its conse-
quences may be identical. Armed with -government aid, many corpora-
tions may look to exports regardless of whether its government makes
the grant contingent on export expansion. Indeed, similar results may
occur even if the government regulation provides an opposite contin-
gency, making the grant dependent on increased production for the do-
mestic market. A domestic subsidy may allow the corporation to
undercut the price that foreign competitors charge, thus permitting the
corporation to recapture part of its domestic market and providing an-
other barrier to international free trade. A domestic subsidy is nothing
more than an indirect export subsidy. Government action cannot be so
rigidly compartmentalized into "domestic" and "export"-the two cat-
egories greatly overlap and should not be distinguished.
All subsidies, whether domestic or export, invariably harm inter-
national free trade. As the United States Secretary of Commerce, Mal-
colm Baldrige, has commented, "domestic adjustment policies
profoundly affect the international transfer of goods, services and capi-
tal. Adjustment does not occur in a vacuum. . . ."I' National econo-
mies are inextricably intertwined. One state's defensive measures to
combat recession necessarily have an impact on the economies of other
states.49
C. The Distinction Between Agriculture, Industry, and
Manufacturing
In seeking to apply the domestic subsidy/export subsidy distinc-
tion, GATT developed a second distinction between its treatment of
agriculture, industry, and manufacturing. The basis of this approach
lies in a compromise struck between the United States and the EEC.50
The American achievement consisted of incorporating agriculture in
the GATT framework for the first time.5' The European success arose
from the Tokyo Round's less stringent treatment of agriculture.52 The
48 Address by Malcolm Baldrige, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development,
in Paris (May 10, 1982), quoted in U.S. Officials Warn of Protectionism Dangers at OECD, Urge
Services Talks, [Apr.-Sept. 1982] INT'L TRADE RP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 407, at 195
(May 11, 1982).
49 This is in part the product of technological advances that have shrunk the world and made
it physically easier to conduct international trade. Technological advances have also helped to
increase production, thereby increasing the quantity of goods available for trade.
50 See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
51 Id
52 See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
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Agreement's solution represented the maximum possible infringement
acceptable to a Common Market ever sensitive to criticisms of its com-
mon agricultural policy.
3
GATT produced a straight-forward formulation with respect to in-
dustry and manufacturing. Article 9(1) stated unequivocally that
"[s]ignatories shall not grant export subsidies on products other than
certain primary products."54 Article 9(2) defined export subsidy in
terms of the practices listed in the annex."
The approach to agriculture was more complicated. GATT dealt
with domestic subsidies in the agricultural sector as it had with domes-
tic subsidies in industry and manufacturing, permitting domestic subsi-
dies, but urging states to minimize the harm they caused other states.56
A marked change occurred, however, in handling the problem of ex-
port subsidies. In place of the outright ban on export subsidies in in-
dustry and manufacturing, Article 10 required only that signatories
refrain from granting subsidies that result in that state acquiring "more
than an equitable share" of world export trade in the subsidized
product. 7
Definitional uncertainties in Article 10 allowed governments con-
siderable latitude in devising and implementing a wide range of export
subsidies in the agricultural sector. Article 10(1) required that an as-
sessment of "equitable share" should take account of "the shares of the
signatories in trade in the product concerned during a previous repre-
sentative period, and any special factors which may have affected or
may be affecting trade in such product."58 The concept of "equitable
share" included cases in which the grant of an export subsidy resulted
in the "displace[ment of] the exports of another signatory bearing in
mind the developments on world markets. 59 When export subsidies
allowed a state to penetrate new markets, "equitable share" was to be
determined by an analysis of "traditional patterns of supply of the
product concerned to the world market, region or country, in which the
new market is situated .... ,,60 GATT defined a "previous representa-
tive period" as "normally" the three most recent calendar years in
53 See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
54 Agreement on Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII, supra note 29, art. 9(1), reprinted in GATT,
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 68.
55 Id art. 9(2), reprinted in GATT, B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 69.
56 Id art. 11(2), reprinted in GATT, B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 70. This provision applies to all
sectors of the economy.
57 Id art. 10(1), reprinted in GATT, B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 69.
58 Id
59 Id art. 10(2)(a), reprinted in GATT, B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 69.
60 Id art. 10(2)(b), reprinted in GATT, B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 69.
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which "normal market conditions existed."'61 Finally, signatories
agreed not to grant export subsidies on agricultural products in such a
way as to result in prices "materially below those of other supplies to
the same market. 62
The distinction's principal weakness is that it rests on a static view
of world trade. Adherence to the GATT position creates a danger that
market shares will be locked at present levels. GATT requires that the
equitable share test depend on an analysis of the market over the three
previous years of normal market conditions, but fails to define those
"normal" conditions. Furthermore, GATT's formulation presupposes
that agricultural free trade existed during a recent three-year period.63
Although GATT allows consideration of "special factors" in the analy-
sis,' it offers no clue as to what they might include and how they might
be weighted. Hence, faithful adoption of the GATT rules would re-
ward those farmers who recently enjoyed high government subsidies,
while placing the unsubsidized at a permanent disadvantage.
An effort to assess the amount of damage that export subsidies
cause further compounds the problem. To avoid freezing market
shares at present levels, it is necessary to separate unnatural trade ad-
vantages created by subsidies from natural trade advantages. In con-
trast to other sectors of the economy, agriculture relies not only on
economic and technological factors, but also on natural factors, such as
soil, climate, and geography. Demand for agricultural goods remains
relatively stable, while supply is both hard to predict and susceptible to
wide fluctuations.65
Violent storms in California that decimated 1982 raisin and to-
mato crops provide an example of this difficulty. 66 The storms struck
without warning and, with one stroke, destroyed as much as seventy
percent of the crop.67 That development renders worthless any assess-
61 Id art. 10(2)(c), reprinted in GATT, B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 69.
62 Id art. 10(3), reprinted in GATT, B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 69.
63 The Tokyo Round aims to regulate agricultural export subsidies, and to lessen their damag-
ing effects. See Agreement on Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII, supra note 29, preamble, reprinted in
GATT, B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 56. But GATT seeks to do this by restricting market shares to
those presently existing although they were achieved by the very subsidies GATT wishes to
curtail.
64 Agreement on Articles V1, Xvi, and XXIII, supra note 29, art. 10(1), reprinted in GATT,
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 69.
65 See generally Barcelo, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Anti Dumping After the Tokyo
Round, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257, 280 (1980) (on distinction between natural and unnatural
trade advantages).
66 N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 1982, at A17, col. 1 (late city ed.).
67 Id
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ment of the impact of subsidized raisins and tomatoes from abroad
competing with American raisins and tomatoes for United States and
foreign markets.68
Two independent reports on the state of agriculture in the United
States reveal that the problems of that sector stem from an innumerable
variety of factors.6 9 The United States Department of Agriculture
bemoaned a situation in which record United States crops faced weak
internal and external demand.70 United States agriculture suffered be-
cause of a substantial appreciation in the value of the dollar abroad,
world recession, hard currency shortages in Eastern Europe and the
Third World, and larger harvests elsewhere.7' The grant of export sub-
sidies by foreign governments affected only that last item. In a report
prepared for a Chicago bank, emphasis was again placed on the in-
creasing value of the dollar.72 A massive collapse in the value of the
Mexican peso particularly hurt since Mexico is the third largest pur-
chaser of the United States' agricultural products.73
These complexities defy precise statistical analysis. The GATT
world of export subsidies consists of educated guesswork and intelli-
gent speculation that export subsidies cause a certain monetarily quan-
tifiable amount of damages.74 In the spring of 1982, David Stockman,
director of the United States Office of Management and Budget, at-
tempted to discover the Export-Import Bank's success rate in generat-
ing exports through its programs of export credit guarantees.75 The
Export-Import Bank calculated that every additional $1 billion worth
of exports produced 24,000 extra jobs.7 6 Stockman's office suggested
that the figure might run closer to 12,000 extra jobs,7 7 while past Agri-
68 Id
69 For a discussion of reports by the United States Department of Agriculture and Continental
Illinois Bank of Chicago, see U.S. Agriculture Exports Expected to Dip About 4 Percent in Fiscal
1982, USDA Says, [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 412, at 410
(June 15, 1982).
70 Id
71 Id at 411.
72 Id
73 Id
74 Id As both reports indicate, current problems plaguing United States agriculture have re-
suilted from a variety of factors. It is impossible to calculate precisely the respective weight of
those factors. The impact of export subsidies cannot be isolated and the effort to do so is scarcely
worthwhile.
75 Number of Jobs Related to Loans Disputed in Office of Management and Budget Memo,
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culture Department research has indicated a figure of 35,000 jobs.78
Such divergence indicates that efforts to calculate the impact of export
subsidies may entail more work than they are worth. If that is so, then
GATT's second distinction only promises to inflict on the world a static
conception of international trade and to spawn as many inconsistencies
as it cures.
III. THE UNITED STATES/COMMON MARKET QUARREL OVER
AGRICULTURAL EXPORT SUBSIDIES
On January 1, 1980, the GATT agreement on agricultural export
subsidies came into force.7 9 Despite its good intentions, the GATT for-
mulation has served only to confuse, because it fails to provide govern-
ment and business with clear directives as to which practices are
permissible and which are not.80 The GATT Director-General, Arthur
Dunkel, has acknowledged this criticism, asserting that some states' in-
ability to discover what trading practices were impermissible repre-
sented a major weakness of GATT.8' He noted that confusion tempted
some states to interpret the GATT requirements as best suited their
interests. 2 GATT officials themselves encounter difficulties in finding
their way through the mire of detail that comprises much of the Agree-
ment.83 In his official report on the Tokyo Round negotiations,
Dunkers predecessor, Olivier Long, suggested that government re-
search grants for universities might constitute an impermissible sub-
sidy.' In fact, Article 11(3) of the Agreement indicated that
"government financing of research and development programmes" is a
permissible domestic subsidy. William Brock, the United States
Trade Representative, has stated bluntly that the agricultural code was
so vague that the United States government did not know what it cov-
ered.86 As a result, he continued, "[w]e are taking them [the EC] to
78 New Billion Dollar Revolving Fund Would Increase Prices, Create Jobs, [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L
TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 411, at 368 (June 8, 1982).
79 Agreement on Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII, supra note 29, art. 19(4), reprinted in GATT,
B.I.S.D., (26th Supp.), at 78.
80 See supra notes 29-78 and accompanying text.
81 Address by Arthur Dunkel, National Press Club, in Washington D.C. (July 15, 1982), dis-
cussed in GA YTT Director Dunkel Criticizes Trend To Unilateral Trade Law Interpretation, [Apr.-
Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 416, at 557 (July 20, 1982).
82 Id
83 REPORT BY THE DIRECToR-GENERAL OF GATT, supra note 18, at 54.
84 Id
85 Agreement on Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII, supra note 29, art. 11(3), reprinted in GATT,
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 70.
86 EC Official Charges U.S. with Risking Protectionism in Protests Over Exports, [Apr.-Sept.]
INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 412, at 398 (June 15, 1982).
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GATT to see if the rules are valid .... If not, we are going to change
the rules to make them adequate to open markets to our goods
abroad.""7
Brock's rhetoric is symptomatic of the long-running saga of
United States/EEC agricultural trade relations. The dispute provides a
case-study of the practical operation of the GATT scheme. The results
are sobering, amply underscoring Dunkel's dismal summary. Both the
United States and the EEC favor agricultural free trade when it suits
their interests; both develop rationalizations to explain the recurrent
occasions when the exigencies of the domestic political scene demand
semi-protectionist policies.88 GATT remains ineffective, powerless to
intervene to bolster the ideals it upholds.
A. Differences of Philosophy
The United States/EEC conflict, and the failures of GATT, arise
in part from differing philosophies with respect to trade policies.
GATT stands firmly wedded to the creed of agricultural free trade.89
The United States, despite its frequent lapses into protectionism, af-
firms that ideal.9" By contrast, the EEC's position is at best ambivalent.
The basis of this ambivalence is the belief that the agricultural sector of
the economy is in the process of major transformation.9 Due to tech-
nological advances, the previously familiar family farm has given way
to the much larger commercial farm.92 A result of that change has
been the ability of the agricultural sector to boost production while
trimming its workforce.93 The trend has been in progress for several
decades and continues today.94 The farm community is experiencing a
traumatic transition in which some farmers must learn to adapt to the
new technology, while others must seek alternative employment.95
Common Market policy attempts to cushion the effects of this transi-
tion. At least in theory, the common market agricultural policy's pro-
tectionist elements act as a means to such an end and would be
87 Id
88 See infra notes 145-177 and accompanying text.
89 See supra notes 18-78 and accompanying text.
90 See infra notes 123-141 and accompanying text.
91 For a summary of Common Market philosophy on agriculture, see REPORT BY THE DIREC-
ToR-GENERAL OF GATT, supra note 18, at 19-20.
92 For a summary of technological advances and their effects in the United States, see Ras-
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removed once the transition concludes.9 6 In practical terms, the EEC
favors international measures to stabilize agricultural trade through
commodity arrangements and a sufficiently high income level for farm-
ers.97 It seeks managed markets involving multinational arrangements
on prices, stockpiling procedures, and coordination of exports.98
The Treaty of Rome,99 which created the EEC, contains the philo-
sophical underpinning for these ideas. Article 39(1) lists the objectives
of Community agricultural policy.0 They include the desire to in-
crease the earnings of individual farmers so as to ensure a "fair stan-
dard of living" for Common Market farmers, and to stabilize
markets. 1° 1 The common agricultural policy is to assure availability of
supply at reasonable prices.1
0 2
The Treaty of Rome sought the establishment of free trade within
the Common Market and a united front in Community relations with
the outside world. Article 111(1) provides that member states "shall"
coordinate trade relations with third countries so as to bring about the
conditions needed for a common policy in external trade. 3 Article
112(1) requires member states to harmonize their export subsidy sys-
tems to ensure that competition between undertakings of the Commu-
nity is not distorted. 0 4 There is no concern for possible distortions of
competition with non-member states.'
0 5
The common agricultural policy consists of a series of regulations
that the Common Market's Council of Ministers' 06 has issued through-
out the Community's twenty-six year existence. 0 7 The regulations ap-
ply either to a single agricultural commodity, or to a group of
commodities, and together form a detailed system of levies, price sup-
ports, and export refunds. 10 The regulations also create rules of com-
petition, quantity and quality control, safeguard measures, and
96 REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF GATT, supra note 18, at 19-20.
97 Id
98 Id
99 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
100 Treaty of Rome, supra note 99, art. 39(l)(b), (c).
101 Id
102 Id
103 Id art. lI(1).
104 Id art. 112(l).
105 The Treaty is silent on this subject.
106 The Council of Ministers consists of the Agriculture Ministers of the ten members of the
EEC.
107 For an explanation of the operation of the common agricultural policy, see ECONOMIST,
Oct. 23, 1982, at 52.
108 Id
US/Common Market Agricultural Trade
5:326(1983)
financial regulations." 9 The main areas of contention with the United
States, and indeed within the Common Market itself, concern the price
support and export refund systems."10 These systems require the Coun-
cil of Ministers to select a Community price for farm products, usually
far above world prices.I' The EEC permits its farmers to sell at world
prices and then makes up the difference between world prices and the
Common Market prices itself."' Thus, EEC farmers can enjoy large
profits even if their production costs exceed market prices." 3
The EEC makes little effort to hide its GATT violations.1 4 Al-
though the EEC has endorsed the GATT formulation, 1 5 the common
agricultural policy ignores the GATT limitations on the use of export
subsidies. For example, the Council of Ministers' regulation dealing
with pigmeat, promulgated in 1975, states that the Common Market
may grant export refunds so as to ensure that Community producers
are competitive on the world market." 6 The regulation dealing with
sheep and goatmeat, announced after the conclusion of the Tokyo
Round, permits export refunds to the extent necessary to enable the
products to be exported.1 7 There is frequently no reference to GATT
notions of "equitable share.""'  Indeed, the regulation concerning
fruits and vegetables, announced in 1972, stresses the use of export re-
funds, to the extent necessary to enable export in economically signifi-
cant quantities.' 19
The reasoning of both the Treaty of Rome and the Council regula-
tions has enjoyed support from the European Community's Court of
Justice. The Court has frequently stressed the Treaty's aim to promote
internal free trade.'2 At the same time, it has proved equally unequiv-






114 The official EEC position is not to deny charges of subsidization, but to stress that the
Community is no more to blame than anyone else. See, e.g., Dalsager, Why is the EEC Being
Blamedfor the Plight of American Farmers?, EUROPE, Sept. 1982, at 12.
115 See supra notes 24-78 and accompanying text.
116 18 O.L Eur. Comm. (No. L 282) 1 (1975).
117 23 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 183) 1 (1980).
118 See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
119 15 J.O. Eur. Comm. (No. L 118) 1 (1972), reprinted in SPECIAL ENGLISH EDITION (II) 437
(1972).
120 See, e.g., Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen v. Waren-Import-Gesellschaft Krohn & Co.,
1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 451, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8094.
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Hauptzollant-Hamburg-Jonas,12 1 it stated that "the [export] refund
serves two purposes: to reduce surpluses and, more particularly, to
compensate for the higher price levels within the Community as com-
pared with the world market."'
' 22
The United States government welcomed the Tokyo Round
amendments to GATT more enthusiastically than the EEC. The Trade
Agreements Act of 1979123 provided the mechanism under which the
GATT provisions became American law. The Act's most important
change lay in the incorporation of a "material injury" requirement into
American countervailing duty law. 24 Prior to the Trade Agreements
121 Muras v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 963, COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8224.
122 Id at 969, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9051.
123 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.).
124 The Trade Agreements Act defines "material injury" at 19 U.S.C. 1677(7) (Supp. IV 1980).
The text of the provision reads, in pertinent part:
(A) In general.-The term "material injury" means harm which is not inconsequential, im-
material, or unimportant.
(B) Volume and consequent impact.-In making its determinations ... the Commission
shall consider, among other factors-
(i) The volume of imports of the merchandise which is the subject of the
investigation,
(ii) The effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United States for like
products, and
(iii) The impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of like
products.
(C) Evaluation of volume and of price effects.-For purposes of subparagraph (B)-
(i) Volume.-In evaluating the volume of imports of merchandise, the Commission
shall consider whether the volume of imports of the merchandise, or any increase
in that volume, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption
in the United States, is significant.
(ii) Price.-In evaluating the effect of imports of such merchandise on prices, the
Commission shall consider whether-
(I) there has been significant price undercutting by the imported merchandise
as compared with the price of like products of the United States, and
(II) the effect of imports of such merchandise otherwise depresses prices to a
significant degree or prevents price increases, which otherwise would have
occurred, to a significant degree.
(iii) Impact on affected industry.-In examining the impact on the affected industry,
the Commission shall evaluate all relevant economic factors which have a bearing
on the state of the industry, including, but not limited to-
(I) actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, produc-
tivity, return on investments, and utilization of capacity,
(II) factors affecting domestic prices, and
(III) actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment,
wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and investment.
(D) Special rules for agricultural products.-
(i) The Commission shall not determine that there is no material injury or threat of
material injury to United States producers of an agricultural commodity merely
because the prevailing market price is at or above the minimum support price.
(ii) In the case of agricultural products, the Commission shall consider any increased
burden on government income or price support programs.
(E) Special rules.-For purposes of this paragraph-
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Act, the government could impose countervailing duties whenever a
country employed export subsidies on goods imported into the United
States. 25 Under the Act, the government may initiate countervailing
duties only if the export subsidies caused material injury to American
enterprises.
126
In one area the Trade Agreements Act went further than the
GATT formulation. While endorsing the Agreement's illustrative list
of export subsidies, the Act also placed limits on the use of certain do-
mestic subsidies.1 27 Where GATT had permitted domestic subsidies in
recognition of their role in achieving domestic economic and social
objectives, the Trade Agreements Act outlined four impermissible do-
mestic subsidies: (i) the provision of capital, loans or loan guarantees
on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations; (ii) the provision
of goods and services at preferential rates; (iii) the grant of funds or
forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sustained by a specific in-
dustry; and (iv) the assumption of costs or expenses of manufacture,
production or distribution.
28
The Trade Agreements Act promotes international free trade by
eliminating some domestic subsidies. American trade policy, however,
offsets this laissez-faire approach. The United States employs a mecha-
(ii) Standard for determination.-The presence or absence of any factor which the
Commission is required to evaluate under subparagraph (C) or (D) shall not nec-
essarily give decisive guidance with respect to the determination by the Commis-
sion of material injury.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (Supp. IV 1980).
125 See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1913 which reads, in pertinent part:
That wherever any country. . . shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or
grant upon the exportation of any article or merchandise from such country.. . and such
article or merchandise is dutiable under the provisions of this Act, then upon the importation
of any such article or merchandise. . . there shall be levied and paid. . . in addition to the
duties otherwise imposed by this Act, an additional duty equal to the net amount of such
bounty or grant....
Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
126 The incorporation of a "material injury" standard represents a change of form rather than
substance.
Before Tokyo Round, American law permitted the imposition of a countervailing duty when-
ever a foreign state gave aid or advantage to its exports to the United States. The impact of the
exports on American industry was irrelevant. See, G.S. Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 7 Ct.
Cust. App. 97 (1916), aft'd, 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
The rigors of that law were mitigated, however, by granting the Treasury Department broad
discretion in defining subsidies. The Treasury Department remained hostile to the countervailing
duty weapon, and dragged its feet, delaying investigations and employing a disguised "material
injury" test. See generally Jacobs & Hove, Remediesfor Unfair Import Competition in the United
States, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1980), and Note, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Under the
Trade.4ct of1979, 5 N.C. J. INr'L L. & COM. REG. 533 (1980).
127 Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
128 Id
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nism of price support systems and export incentives for farmers, per-
haps on a smaller scale than those of the common agricultural policy,
but no less pervasive.'29
The Agricultural Trade Act of 1978130 reflects one effort to boost
exports through the use of government aid and expertise. It reveals the
inconsistency between American acceptance of GATT and the realities
of a policy that is, at best, contrary to the spirit of international free
trade. The Act included an intermediate credit program to finance
commercial sales of agricultural goods on credit of from three to ten
years.' 3 ' The aim of the scheme was to fill a vacuum between existing
long-term financing programs for the poorest states and the more short-
term financing available through the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion. 132  The Act loosened regulations concerning deferred payment
sales. 3 3 For the first time it allowed a private American exporter to
negotiate an importing country's financing arrangements with the
Commodity Credit Corporation, thereby permitting the importing
country to utilize the American exporter's greater familiarity with ad-
ministrative procedures.' 34 The Act also authorized the upgrading of
the title of chief agricultural officer in a number of American diplo-
matic missions and permitted the establishment of agricultural trade
offices around the world. 135 The offices were to channel information on
foreign markets back to American farmers, while promoting the desira-
bility of American farm products in those potential importing
countries.
136
The bill's proponents attempted to down-play subsidization.'37
They made it clear that the intermediate credit program was aimed
solely at securing new markets and must not be a vehicle for provoking
a credit war with foreign states over existing markets.138 That assertion
seemed to presume that the United States could roam the world search-
ing for new customers on its own. In fact, exporting states throughout
129 The United States spent more than $14 billion for farm supports in 1981-82. ECONOMIST,
Oct. 23, 1982, at 52.
130 Agricultural Trade Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-501, 92 Stat. 1685 (1978) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
131 Id 7 U.S.C. § 1707a(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
132 Note, Promoting Agricultural Exports: The Agricultural Trade Act of1978, 5 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & CoM. REG. 263, 266-68 (1978).
133 7 U.S.C. § 1707b(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
134 Id
135 7 U.S.C. § 1762(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
136 7 U.S.C. § 1761 (Supp. IV 1980).
137 S. REP. No. 1142, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 7-8 (1978).
138 Id
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the world are constantly involved in a struggle to acquire fresh mar-
kets. The intermediate credit program represents an export subsidy,
similar to those offered in most states, designed to promote the attrac-
tiveness of American exports. The fact that Congress intended that the
program only be used to secure new markets does not make it any less
of an export subsidy.
139
At times, the veil of free trade drops entirely. One commentator
has noted that a motivation for the intermediate credit program stems
from official efforts to aid in the export of livestock."4 America suffers
from competition with the EEC for third country markets that are geo-
graphically closer to the EEC nations. The intermediate credit pro-
gram helps to blunt that European competitive edge. In that respect,
the Act flagrantly violates GATT. 4' Geographic proximity to markets




During 1982, agricultural trade relations between the United
States and the EEC steadily deteriorated. 43 The GATT ministerial
meeting, at the end of 1982, did little to prevent the parties from drift-
ing further apart.'" In March 1982, United States Deputy Secretary of
Agriculture, Richard E. Lyng, spent more than a week touring Euro-
pean capitals. 145 He concluded that little hope existed that the Reagan
administration could persuade the EEC to reduce subsidies.' In April
1982, the parties confronted each other at a meeting of major world
grain producers in Ottawa. 47 The United States urged production cuts
and threatened to implement subsidies and credit competition to en-
139 Id
140 Note, supra note 132, at 267-68.
141 Id A reading of the illustrative list of export subsidies indicates that aid to negate geo-
graphical disadvantages must be an export subsidy. Item (c) of the illustrative list of export subsi-
dies, states that the payment of internal transport and freight charges on export shipments are an
impermissible export subsidy. Agreement on Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII, supra note 29, annex,
reprinted in GATT, B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 80. It is reasonable to assume that aid for external
transportation would be similarly impermissible.
142 Id
143 See infra notes 145-168 and accompanying text.
144 See infra notes 169-177 and accompanying text.
145 L g Disappointed Over European Unwillingness to Stem Subsidies, [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L
TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 403, at 35 (Apr. 13, 1982).
146 Id
147 World Grain Suppliers' Talks Show Little Agreement on Reducing Supply, [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L
TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 405, at 112 (Apr. 27, 1982).
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courage exports in the event of a failure to agree.'48 The EEC blandly
asserted that it was working to reduce agricultural subsidies.'49
During 1982, threats developed into action. In March, at the re-
quest of the United States, GATT set up investigation panels to evalu-
ate Common Market subsidies on processed peaches, pears, and
raisins. 5' The EEC counterattacked, urging GATT to rule illegal the
United States' domestic international sales corporation program. 5
United States Agriculture Secretary, John R. Block, informed the
United States Senate's Joint Economic Committee that "we are going
to be taking a very hard, tough stand" at forthcoming GATT meet-
ings.152 Seeley Lodwick, United States Undersecretary of Agriculture
for International Affairs and Commodity Programs, vigorously criti-
cized the EEC, asserting that "we've been talking with them about this
for 18 months. We have not been heard, and we've seen no pro-
gress." 53 Poul Dalsager, the Common Market's Commissioner for Ag-
riculture, speaking to Community agriculture ministers, maintained
that, since the United States was becoming "increasingly aggressive" in
its export policies, the EEC must develop a "more coherent strategy"
for exporting farm products.'54 The Common Market, he continued,
must identify its best potential customers and coordinate its export
credit policies."'
The United States has pursued two additional parallel initiatives
in its struggle against the EEC: increased promotion of its farm prod-
ucts abroad and stepping up of direct export subsidies to agriculture at
home.' 56 Promotional activities focus on a partnership between the
Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture and pri-
vate organizations. 7 The Foreign Agricultural Service deals with
more than fifty non-profit, product-specific trade associations, such as
the Cotton Council International, the American Soybean Association,
148 Id
149 Id at 112-13.
150 GA7TAgrees to Set Up Dispute Panels on Canada's FIRA, ECFruit Subsidies, [Apr.-Sept.]
INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 402, at 15-16 (Apr. 6, 1982).
151 Falkland Islands Crisis Preempts DISC Attack in GATT But EC Taking Hard Line, [Apr.-
Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 407, at 192 (May 11, 1982).
152 Block Tells Congress Long-Term Soviet Grain Agreement Would Be Benefcial, [Apr.-Sept.]
INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 404, at 79-80 (Apr. 20, 1982).
153 CHICAGO TRiPtNE, Sept. 26, 1982, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
'54 Agricultural Export Subsidies Expected to Remain Key Policy, EC Ofcial Says, [Apr.-Sept.]
INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 416, at 560 (July 20, 1982).
155 Id
156 See infra notes 158-168 and accompanying text.
157 See infra notes 158-161 and accompanying text.
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and the Poultry and Egg Institute.' Together, the government and
those private groups seek to advertise the quality of American farm
products to potential overseas customers. In fiscal year 1982, the De-
partment of Agriculture planned to spend $25 million to support those
groups;' 59 the groups hoped to raise twice that amount themselves.' 60
Typical projects include government sponsorship of United States
booths at trade fairs abroad and high-level visits abroad by government
officials and farmer representatives.1
61
The Reagan administration had hoped to limit agricultural export
subsidies as part of its general pruning of the budget.' 62 The govern-
ment has nevertheless been under considerable pressure to increase
subsidies in the face of distress on American farms.'63 A proliferation
of bills and amendments have appeared in Congress seeking to extend
the President's powers to loosen export credit regulation and to grant
the Export-Import Bank further funds to use to finance exports. 64 The
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of Fiscal Year 1983165 specifically
directs the Agriculture Department to use between $175 million and
$190 million of Commodity Credit Corporation funds to combat for-
eign government subsidies of exports. The American Farm Bureau, a
private group and perennial champion of free trade, has urged exten-
sion of export subsidies.' 66 Last year the United States government
purchased nine percent of the United States' production of milk, butter,
and cheese.167 In September 1982, Seeley Lodwick, United States Un-
dersecretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity
Programs, answered "'emphatically yes,'" when reporters asked him if
the administration planned to extend agricultural export subsidies.'68
The United States/EEC dispute reached a climax at GATT's min-
isterial meeting in November 1982. The United States had eagerly
pressed for such a meeting in the early months of the Reagan adminis-
tration, hoping to use it to expand GATT's rules to reduce trade barri-
158 Study Examines Private Sector Takeover of Government Trade Promotion Duties, [Apr.-




162 Effort to Raise Bankts Direct Credit 4uthorization Defeated on House Fioor, [Apr.-Sept.]
INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 411, at 360 (June 8, 1982).
163 Id
164 See generaly Farm Bureau Supports Legislation to Counter EC Subsidized Finance, [Apr.-
Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 424, at 885 (Sept. 14, 1982).
165 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-253, 96 Stat. 763 (1982).
166 N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1982, at 38, col. 4.
167 CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 25, 1982, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
168 Id Sept. 26, 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
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ers in the service sector of the economy and to set a "trade agenda for
the 1980s. ' '169 Deepening world recession and increasingly acrimonious
relations between the United States, EEC, and Japan extinguished the
Americans' early optimism.' By the time the Geneva meeting finally
convened, doubts for the very survival of GATT had replaced ambi-
tious plans for expanding its reach. As two American officials suc-
cinctly stated on the eve of the conference, "[i]f this month's ministerial
meeting . . . fails to re-establish the momentum for trade liberaliza-
tion, the system could eventually collapse under protectionism."''
The November 1982 GATT meeting did not spell doom for inter-
national free trade, but neither did it ensure its salvation. At the elev-
enth hour, delegates drafted a ministerial declaration "reaffirming their
commitment to abide by their GATT obligations and to support and
improve the GATT trading system."' z The United States and the
EEC broke an impasse over agriculture by delaying the need for a deci-
sion. The ministers created a committee to review the state of agricul-
tural trade and to make recommendations with a view to prompting
greater liberalization.' 73
Opinions as to the success of the meeting varied. GATT Director
General Arthur Dunkel optimistically asserted that the final declara-
tion "amounts to a clear commitment to fight collectively against pro-
tectionism."' 74 William Brock proved more circumspect, commenting
that "over all, the results might get a grade of C."'175 The agriculture
committee must submit its suggestions for reform in 1984 and it is per-
haps unwise to completely evaluate the 1982 ministerial meeting until
that time.'7 6 Nevertheless, GATT's future looks ominous. It is likely
that history will consign the ministerial meeting to an insignificant
footnote and chide the delegates of the United States and the EEC for
skirting an issue that demanded serious consideration.
77
169 WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1982, at 28, col. 1 (midwest edition).
170 Id
171 Aho & Bayard, World Trade's Future, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1982, at 21, col. 5 (C. Michael
Aho is deputy director of the Labor Department's Office of International Economic Affairs.
Thomas 0. Bayard is an economist there.).
172 Excerptsfrom Ministerial Declaration at GATT Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1982, at
34, col. 1.
173 1d
174 N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1982, at 35, col. 1.
175 Id at 29, col. 4.
176 Id at 34, col. 1.
177 The editorial stance of the New York Times the day after the conclusion of the conference
presents perhaps the most likely favorable verdict: "Anything is preferable to rearming for trade
war. And by that sober standard, what happened in Geneva was a welcome, if weak, blow for
peace." N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1982, at 26, col. 1.
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C. A Suggested New Role for GATT
The clearest signal to emerge from Geneva is that states will con-
tinue to tamper with GATT rules when it suits their interests and that
bilateral negotiations offer the only genuine prospect of a resolution to
the United States/EEC agricultural trade dispute. '" Indeed, while the
future for GATT appears bleak, the chances of an amicable agreement
between the United States and the EEC over agricultural trade have
brightened. The delegates who procrastinated in Geneva are spending
the early months of 1983 locked in intense bilateral negotiations.179 In
all likelihood, the two trading blocks will avert a trade war and pro-
duce a mutually satisfactory agreement. That agreement will probably
involve a voluntary reduction in EEC farm exports in the same way as
the EEC has voluntarily limited its steel exports to the United States1
8 0
and Japan has curbed its automobile exports to the United States.'
In both those cases resolution emerged as the result of bilateral
negotiations and involved a diminution of international free trade. 82
Political pressures dictated solutions which ignored the philosophical
underpinnings of GATT. International free trade only makes sense in
the context of a world of states wedded to domestic free enterprise.
That world does not exist and GATT faces an uphill task in attempting
to force free market conditions on a mixed-economy international mar-
ketplace. The reality of recession limits GATT's effectiveness. In a
world of sovereign states, political leaders look to help their own before
seeking to benefit mankind in general. No electorate will accept a pol-
icy promising to leave domestic producers at the mercy of more effi-
cient foreign competitors.
8 3
178 See infra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
179 WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1983, at 10, col. 3 (midwest edition).
Rhetoric has also turned into action. In January 1983, the United States government subsi-
dized the sale of one million-tonnes of wheat flour to Egypt, thereby breaking into a market that
France has traditionally served. The EEC responded in February 1983 with the sale of over one
million-tonnes of subsidized wheat to China, a traditional United States market. ECONOMIST,
Feb. 26, 1983, at 40.
These events reveal again both the danger of trade war and the impotence of GATT. The
stage is set for a major confrontation between the United States and the EEC. The result will be
either trade war or a negotiated settlement-the role of GATT is unlikely to be significant.
180 U.S., E.C Reach Agreement on European Export Curbs, Complaints Withdrawn, [Oct.-Mar.]
INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) Vol. 7, No. 4, at 99 (Oct. 27, 1982).
181 House Commerce Committee Opens Debate on Local Content with Approval Expected [Apr.-
Sept.] INTL TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 144, at 727 (Sept. 15, 1982).
182 Id, U.S., E C Reach Agreement on European Export Curbs, Complaints Withdrawn, supra
note 180.
183 The point has been put most aptly by the Common Market's president, Gaston Thorn.
Speaking in Bruges, Belgium, Thorn stated:
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The particular details of the United States/EEC dispute under-
score GATT's shortcomings. The sheer size of the common agricul-
tural policy decrees that a dismantling of trade barriers cannot be
achieved overnight. The common agricultural policy accounts for
sixty-six percent of total Common Market spending.'" 4 Eliminate the
policy and the EEC disappears with it.
18 5
It is futile to attempt to apportion blame between the United
States and the EEC. As Claude Veillain, the EEC's Director-General
of Agriculture, has noted, it is "almost impossible" to obtain a precise
idea of the financial support governments provide to agriculture.'86
Government aid does not involve just direct budgetary support, "but
all the direct and indirect transfers of resources to the farm sector."'
18 7
Policies affecting land, production costs, direct and indirect taxes, and
transfer costs all have an impact on agricultural incomes. l8
The inability to define export subsidy further compounds the
problem. Former GATT Director Olivier Long admitted prior to To-
kyo Round that "because of the range and extent of measures that
might be considered subsidies, it's been impossible to agree on precise
definitions of criteria to be applied."'1 9 Despite ostensible agreement,
Tokyo Round failed to provide clarity. 9 ' Its effort to distinguish ex-
port subsidies from domestic subsidies was unavailing.19' If successful,
it might reduce overall subsidies, yet many government stimuli would
remain permissible and the problems of market distortion would not
change appreciably. The effort to distinguish agriculture from industry
and manufacturing creates its own definitional problems and has been
At a time when the number of EEC jobless is approaching 1 Im, no government can afford to
act in line with theoretical models of perfect competition and indulge in free trade at anyprce. What is important is to find, along with our trading partners, an acceptable balance
btween the advantages of free competition and the social and political constraints which can
at times require protectionist measures.
Reprinted in ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1982, at 51.
184 ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1982, at 80.
185 See generally Joslin & Pearson, Developments in the Common 4gricultural Policy of the Euro-
pean Community, discussed in Agriculture Department Report Shows Shortcomings of High E.C
Subsidies, [Apr.-Sept.] INTL TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 415, at 515-17 (July
13, 1982).
186 Address of Claude Veillain, University of Minnesota, quotedin E. C. Official Talks Tough on
Exports, Vows Battle Against U.S. Aggression, [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY (BNA) No. 407, at 199 (May 11, 1982).
187 Id
188 Id
189 REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF GATT, supra note 18, at 54.
190 See supra notes 29-78 and accompanying text.
191 Id
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easy for the United States and the EEC to evade.' 2
Bilateral agreement compromises international free trade, but at
least it avoids the dangers of piece-meal protectionism and trade war.
Free trade remains a principle which is most attractive during periods
of prosperity. Bilateral agreements, involving a degree of market man-
agement, provide perhaps the most practical means for states to
weather recession.193 Above all, they solve the problem of definition.
GATT sought to define precisely which practices are permissible and
which are not. It tried valiantly to provide a set of rules against which
state actions could be judged. One of GATT's flaws is that the defini-
tions have proved imprecise and the inconsistencies suggest that a nar-
row definition would similarly fail. By contrast, the problem of
definition does not arise with bilateral negotiations. Each party devises
its ideal scenario and, in the course of the negotiations, attempts to per-
suade the other side to accept that scheme. The final result is a com-
promise, in which each side permits the other to engage in certain
policies regardless of whether GATT might deem them domestic or
export subsidies.
GATT faces two options. It can persist in espousing the cause of
free trade. If it follows that course, its exhortations will continue to fall
on deaf ears. States will repeatedly evade the rules GATT has enunci-
ated and the organization will become impotent. Alternatively, GATT
can lower its sights and learn to live with political reality. GATT can
play a valuable, constructive role in aiding states in their bilateral ne-
gotiations. It can act as a forum to allow states to marshall world opin-
ion behind a particular policy and as a conduit to disseminate
information to all states. While such a role might not comport with the
gradiose visions of GATT as the standard-bearer of international free
trade, it is preferable to irrelevance.
An illustration of the role GATT might perform is provided by an
analysis of its participation in the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA).
19 4
The MFA is a multi-lateral agreement that seeks "the orderly and equi-
192 See supra notes 34-78 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text.
194 For text of the MFA, see GATT, Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles,
TEX. NG/l, done, Geneva, Dec. 20, 1973, reprinted in 25 U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840, [herein-
after cited as MFA]. The MFA structure should not be blindly superimposed on the agricultural
sector. The purpose of this reference to the MFA is to examine briefly an occasion when GATT,
despite its faith in free trade, became heavily involved in a market management arrangement.
The experience of the MFA has two lessons of importance to the present discussion. First, it
shows the valuable administrative assistance GATT can offer to individual countries. Second, it
reveals the pit-fall inherent in any effort to establish market management-namely, the tendency
of such arrangements to become permanent.
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table development of. . . trade [in textiles] and avoidance of disrup-
tive effects in individual markets."'' 9 5 The agreement provides for a
degree of market management and a reduction of free trade. 196 GATT
supervises the arrangement seeking to minimize the diminution of free
trade.197
The MFA created a Textiles Committee "within the framework of
GATT."'198 The Committee's function is to prepare studies on the cur-
rent state of world production and trade in textile products, to suggest
measures to aid adjustment and to collect and disseminate statistical
data on the industry. 199 The Textiles Committee must report annually
to the GATT Council on the operation of the MFA.2°° Meanwhile,
responsibility for the daily operation of the MFA belongs to a Textile
Surveillance Body.20' The MFA states that the body "may rely for
technical assistance on the services of the GATT secretariat.
20 2
The MFA supports the ideal of free trade, while accepting the
political need to permit some market management to cushion the ef-
fects of economic recession.20 3 A similar approach might enjoy success
in the agricultural sector. Market management is acceptable if it is of
limited duration and aimed solely at allowing the industry in question
to adjust to changed economic circumstances. The danger is that short-
term market management will become permanent cartelization. Free
trade in textiles is an unlikely prospect and the MFA might be conve-
niently dismissed as cartelization under the name of GATT. Such a
development must not be allowed to occur with agriculture.
IV. CONCLUSION
Three years have passed since GATT's attempt to foster agricul-
tural free trade came into force. As the United States/EEC dispute
indicates, the attempt has been met with seemingly insurmountable dif-
ficulties. The shortcomings of GATT mirror problems encountered in
both early and contemporary efforts at international cooperation. 20
The fate of the GATT initiative demonstrates the difficulties of impos-
195 Id, art. 1(2), at 1004.
196 See infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
197 Id
198 Id, art. 10(1), at 1012.
199 Id, art. 10(2), at 1013.
200 Id,, art. 10(4), at 1013.
201 Id, art. 11(1), at 1013.
202 Id, art. 11(2), at 1013.
203 Id, Preamble, at 1003-04.
204 The most obvious examples are the League of Nations and United Nations.
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ing order on a world of unruly sovereign states and of promoting free
trade during recession.
It is necessary for GATT to acknowledge the realities of an imper-
fect world. If it fails to do, it will atrophy and stand immobile while
the individual states move toward economic and social disaster. Dur-
ing a recession, political pressures stimulate protectionism. An active,
if less ambitious, GATT could play an important role in countering
these pressures and aid the world in overcoming barriers to interna-
tional free trade.
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